Agentic Sandbox v2026.7.10
Agentic Sandbox v2026.7.10
Released: 2026-07-12 Tag: `v2026.7.10` Previous: `v2026.7.9` Compare: `v2026.7.9...v2026.7.10`
What this release is
v2026.7.10 completes the signed release. The runtime is identical to v2026.7.7–v2026.7.9 (the #633/#634 VM control-channel fixes, same binaries). This bump re-runs the pipeline after rotating the release-signing key, so the release finally ships GPG-signed tarballs (`.asc`), cosign-signed images, and the SBOM.
Signing-key rotation (important for verifiers)
The prior shared key (`FE9272F0…E84CE8`) was protected by a personal user passphrase — unusable for headless CI signing and inappropriate for a shared vault. It was replaced with a dedicated CI ed25519 key whose passphrase is machine-generated and stored vault-only. The previous key produced no published signatures, so nothing needs re-verification.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Fingerprint | `9292EFCBB0EA41BECEEFDAFA9C1B8CE0E0E09C33` |
| Key ID | `9C1B8CE0E0E09C33` |
| Algorithm | ed25519 |
| Public key | `docs/releases/keys/agentic-sandbox-release-key.asc` |
This is a cross-project release-signing key — AIWG and other repos share the same vault path and will sign with the new key going forward.
Highlights
- Complete signed release: `.asc` tarball signatures, cosign image
signatures, and SBOM — the pieces v2026.7.8/v2026.7.9 were missing.
- CI secrets fully sourced from OpenBao (#635): registry, GHCR, GitHub
mirror, docsite, mutsu, and the GPG key are all fetched from the vault at job time via a least-privilege AppRole.
Verification
# import the NEW public key
curl -fLO "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jmagly/agentic-sandbox/main/docs/releases/keys/agentic-sandbox-release-key.asc"
gpg --import agentic-sandbox-release-key.asc # expect 9292EFCB…E09C33
docker pull ghcr.io/jmagly/agentic-sandbox-mgmt:v2026.7.10
gpg --verify agentic-sandbox-v2026.7.10-x86_64-linux-gnu.tar.gz.asc \
agentic-sandbox-v2026.7.10-x86_64-linux-gnu.tar.gzFull notes: `CHANGELOG.md` `[2026.7.10]`.